of wearable technologies in the workplace, 8 and we have the scenario for real-time, continuous collection of personal data by employers.
Consider, for example, Myrna Arias's experience with her employer, Intermex Wire Transfer. Shortly after Arias was hired, Intermex instructed its employees to download the Xora app to their smartphones. 9 After determining that the Xora app contains a GPS function, Arias and other employees asked whether Internex would be monitoring their movements while off duty, 10 particularly since Arias and other employees were required to keep their phones' power on "'24/7' to answer phone calls from clients." 11 Not only did Arias's supervisor state that employees would be monitored while off duty, the supervisor "bragged that he knew how fast [Arias] was driving at specific moments ever since she had installed the app on her phone." 12 Arias sued Intermex for, inter alia, invasion of privacy after she was "scolded" by her supervisor for de-installing the Xora app from her smartphone and being fired a few weeks later. 13 
II. WORKPLACE PRIVACY AND EMPLOYER MONITORING
Employers monitor employees' behavior and communications for a number of legitimate business reasons, including productivity, safety and threat prevention, and liability prevention and compliance. 14 After all, a GPS 14. See Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Eavesdropping Employer: A Twenty-First Century Framework for Employee Monitoring, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 285 (2011) (proposing an employee-monitoring framework that balances employer and employee interests with respect to business, liability-avoidance, and application installed on an employee's smartphone can reveal that the employee is in Las Vegas the day he called in sick (and the employer does not have an office there). 15 More often than not, monitoring employee web activity by the employer will probably reveal that many employees do waste work time visiting web sites unrelated to work. 16 In certain circumstances, employers may even be legally compelled to monitor workers. Hostile work environment jurisprudence is one such area. 17 Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 18 and its companion case Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 19 offer employers a defense against a hostile environment created by a supervisor (when no tangible employment action is taken) if it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior. 20 This places greater pressure on employers to monitor employee behavior. 21 And this duty to monitor may extend beyond a hostile work environment. In Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 22 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied Ellerth in holding that the employer, Home Depot U.S.A., could potentially be civilly liable for a supervisor murdering his subordinate because Home Depot granted the killer the supervisory power, which he then abused. 16. See Ciocchetti, supra note 14, at 336. 17. See Fink, supra note 14, at 587-89. 18. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 19. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 20. Specifically, when no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages comprised of two necessary elements: "(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
21. See, e.g., Burlington, 524 U.S. at 770 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Sexual harassment is simply not something that employers can wholly prevent without taking extraordinary measures-constant video and audio surveillance, for example-that would revolutionize the workplace in a manner incompatible with a free society." (citation omitted)); Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 123 F.3d 490, 513 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J., dissenting), aff'd, 524 U.S. 742 ("It is facile to suggest that employers are quite capable of monitoring a supervisor's actions affecting the work environment. Large companies have thousands of supervisory employees. Are they all to be put under video surveillance?").
22. 852 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2017). 23. Id. at 650-51. The supervisor threatened to fire or reduce the subordinate's hours if she did not accompany him on a personal trip; the supervisor murdered the subordinate on that trip. Id. at 648. The supervisor had a history of sexually harassing and verbally abusing his young female subordinates, including his victim. And although he was ordered twice to attend anger management classes, he never completed them and the employer never followed up to make sure he did. Id. at 647; see also Doe v. XYC But these duties to monitor do not necessarily give employers unfettered rights to monitor employees, and particularly employees' computer activities and electronic communications.
A. Common Law Right to Privacy in the Workplace
In the private realm, a person's privacy is not invaded unless there has been a highly offensive intrusion upon that person's solitude or private affairs. 24 In general, courts do not consider the workplace a secluded and private area sufficient to provide a "zone of privacy." 25 Even within a privately-owned workplace, courts consider it more akin to a public place 26 than, say, one's home, where privacy is most sacrosanct. 27 While courts have indeed recognized that employees can have some degree of privacy in the Corp., 887 A.2d 1156, 1158 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) ("[A]n employer who is on notice that one of its employees is using a workplace computer to access pornography, possibly child pornography, has a duty to investigate the employee's activities and to take prompt and effective action to stop the unauthorized activity, lest it result in harm to innocent third-parties. No privacy interest of the employee stands in the way of this duty on the part of the employer."); cf. Muick v. Glenayre Elec., 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he abuse of access to workplace computers is so common (workers being prone to use them as media of gossip, titillation, and other entertainment and distraction) that reserving a right of inspection is so far from being unreasonable that the failure to do so might well be thought irresponsible.").
24 workplace, 28 it is also true that notice by the employer of monitoring can often defeat any expectation of privacy by employees. 29 For example, in Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 30 the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that an employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in email communications sent to her attorney through a private, password-protected, web-based email account, although the employee accessed the account using her employer-provided laptop. 31 The court concluded the employee had "plainly [taken] steps to protect the privacy of those e-mails and shield them from her employer." 32 Importantly, the court also concluded that the employer's electronic communications policy did not address the use of personal, web-based email accounts accessed through company equipment. 33 Stengart involved an employee's communications with her attorney and whether the attorney-client privilege should be maintained. 34 Compare Stengart with Holmes v. Petrovich Development Co., which also involved an employee sending her attorney email messages using the employer's computer system. 35 In Holmes, however, the employer's policy clearly stated that employees using company computers to create or 28 maintain personal information or messages "have no right of privacy with respect to that information or message." 36 The California Court of Appeals concluded that by using the company's computer to communicate with her lawyer, knowing the communications violated company computer policy and could be discovered by her employer due to company monitoring of email usage, the employee's communications were not privileged. 37 Courts do appear to respect individual expectations of privacy in personal, password-protected accounts, 38 even when accessed from an employer-provided computer 39 and the employee in question has configured the account to pre-populate the account's user name and password. 40 Restricting access alone is no absolute bar from an employer still viewing personal information with impunity. Although the "third-party doctrine" originates from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 41 ) (holding former employee "had a subjective belief that his personal e-mail accounts, stored on third-party computer systems, protected (albeit ineffectively) by passwords, would be private"). The court analogized the situation to one where if the former employee "had left a key to his house on the front desk at [the employer], one could not reasonably argue that he was giving consent to whoever found the key, to use it to enter his house and rummage through his belongings." Id. at 561. In addition, the court noted that there was nothing in the employer's email policy to alert employees to the possibility that their private email accounts could also be accessed and viewed by their employer. 44 And careless employees should not expect much privacy protection. For example, Santiago Victor linked his personal Apple account to his employer/Sunbelt-provided iPhone. 45 When Victor left Sunbelt he returned the iPhone, and then linked the iPhone provided by his new employer with his personal Apple account. 46 However, Victor did not "unlink" the Sunbeltprovided iPhone from his account; as a result, for several weeks, electronic data and messages, including text messages, sent to Victor's new employerprovided iPhone were also sent to his Sunbelt-provided iPhone. 47 conduct that directly caused the transmission of his text messages to Sunbelt in the first instance. 48 Chapter 7 of the Restatement (Third) of Employment Law 49 addresses employee privacy and personal autonomy. As reported by the Restatement, employees have a right not to be subjected to wrongful employer intrusions upon their protected privacy interests. 50 Fundamentally, Chapter 7 applies the intrusion-upon-seclusion tort developed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B, to the employment relationship. 51 Chapter 7 attempts to strike a balance between the employer's responsibility for conduct within the workplace and employees' privacy rights. 52 With respect to monitoring electronic communications and data, section 7.03 reports that "[a]n employee has a protected privacy interest against employer intrusion into physical and electronic locations, including employer-provided locations, as to which the employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy." 53 The focus of section 7.03 is on the employee's interest in keeping his or her physical person, certain physical functions, personal possessions, and activities in certain physical and electronic locations private from employer intrusion. 54 The privacy interests in locations reported in section 7.03(a)(2) include non-workplace physical or electronic locations in which the employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy, such as the employee's home, property, and personal possessions. 55 The approach expressed by section 7.03 is that when it comes to personal property or locations that the employee owns or has access to outside of the workplace, employees will generally enjoy the same expectations of privacy against employer intrusions as they do with respect to other third-party intrusions. 56 Importantly, even though the employee might not expect an employer to intrude into non-workplace locations, the employee cannot expect a greater level of freedom from intrusion by the employer than by the general public. 57 By the same token, the employer is not privileged to intrude upon an employee's privacy outside the workplace 48 simply because the employer is otherwise pursuing a legitimate business interest. 58 In congruence with Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B, Chapter 7 of the Restatement (Third) of Employment Law recognizes that, in order to be actionable, an intrusion upon seclusion must be highly offensive to a reasonable person under the circumstances. 59 In the employment context, the Restatement reports that an intrusion is highly offensive if the nature, manner, and scope of the intrusion are clearly unreasonable when judged against the employer's legitimate business interests or the public's interests in intruding. 60 Owing, then, to the "public" nature of the workplace, finding an intrusion to be highly offensive creates a high bar for workplace privacy.
B. Federal Statutes that May Protect Employee Work-Related Communications
Although, on their face, a variety of federal laws appear promising in providing workplace privacy protections, in reality they provide very little protection. And when they do provide protections, it is usually in very constrained circumstances, such as when a worker's private, third-party online account is involved. The statutes do not provide any overarching workplace privacy protection. 61 Federal labor law, on the other hand, provides some of the strongest restrictions on employer monitoring, but, as explained in this part, the foundation for those restrictions may be subject to a changing composition of the National Labor Relations Board. And when it comes to workers recording workplace conversations, labor law is in complete opposition to common law. Finally, the one area providing anything close to an overarching right of privacy in employee electronic communications and data appears to come from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. he general principle under which American law operates is that surveillance is legal unless forbidden.").
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
By its name, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) may appear to be an avenue of privacy protection for employee electronic communications. Fundamentally, Title I of the ECPA 62 (also commonly referred to as the Wiretap Act) prohibits the interception of any "wire, oral, or electronic communication." 63 And, "any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of [the ECPA]" may bring a civil action for relief. 64 But as one court noted over one dozen years ago, "the ECPA was written prior to the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web. As a result, the existing statutory framework is ill-suited to address modern forms of communication like . . . secure website [s] ." 65 Courts have recognized limited circumstances in which an employer may violate the ECPA in accessing employee communications. For example, in Brahmana v. Lembo, 66 the District Court for the Northern District of California refused to dismiss an employee's ECPA claim that his employer had used key loggers to ascertain the password to his private email account and access that account. 67 The fundamental requirement for an ECPA violation is an intentional interception of electronic communications during transmission from inception to end-point. 68 In addition, exceptions within the Wiretap Act also render much of the Act inapplicable to ordinary uses of computer and communications systems within the workplace. Service providers are exempt from liability for intercepting, disclosing, or using communications transmitted over the service in the ordinary course of 62. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. I, 100 Stat. 1848, 1848-59 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § § 2510-2522 (2012) business. 69 The Wiretap Act also exempts from liability anyone who intercepts a communication who is a party to the communication, or where one of the parties has consented to interception. 70 As a result, employers who own and provide their own email and communications systems are exempt from Title I of the ECPA. 71 And employers who outsource their email and communications systems to service providers can also rely on Title I exceptions when they work with their service provider to intercept employee communications. 72 One scholar has concluded the Wiretap Act is already tilted toward employers' interests; it provides no protection for employees from several types of monitoring, including GPS and silent video; and provides no baseline of privacy, such as prohibiting monitoring of communications made between employees and family members in their homes regardless of whether an employee consents. 73 Title II of the ECPA, the Stored Communications Act 74 (SCA), makes it unlawful to access stored communications. The SCA was enacted to address "the growing problem of unauthorized persons deliberately gaining access to, and sometimes tampering with, electronic or wire communications that are not intended to be available to the public." 75 The SCA is violated when a person "(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system . . . ." 76 This definition of electronic storage has caused some confusion with respect to messages stored on a third-party web-based email system. It is accepted that unread email messages can be considered temporarily stored incidental to transmission. But are read messages being stored for backup purposes? 78 The complexities, confusion, and conflicting opinions with respect to applying the SCA to electronic communications are beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say the "SCA is not a catch-all statute designed to protect the privacy of stored Internet communications[.]" 79 At least one court has held that employers are exempt from liability under the SCA for accessing employee email messages stored on their computer systems. 80 Gmail account on her cell phone while also maintaining copies on Google's servers, she has adequately alleged that the emails were in 'electronic storage' because they were stored for backup purposes, regardless of whether they were unopened. . . . 85 Theofel, an ICA employee whose email messages were read by Farey-Jones pursuant to the subpoena, sued Farey-Jones for, inter alia, violation of the CFAA. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court holding that the CFAA did not apply to unauthorized access of a third party's computer. 86 According to the Ninth Circuit, "Individuals other than the computer's owner may be proximately harmed by unauthorized access, particularly if they have rights to data stored on it." 87 Based on Theofel, an employer that improperly accesses an employee's private third-party webbased email system would also violate the CFAA 88 (provided the employee could show that the value of the information obtained was at least $5,000). employees collectively seek to improve their lot as employees. 93 For example, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which enforces the NLRA, has found that employees discussing on Facebook improper state tax withholding by their employer were engaged in protected concerted activity, precisely because the participants were seeking to initiate, induce, or prepare for group action related to a workplace issue (the calculation of the employees' tax withholding). 94 As noted above, an employer's policy can have a significant impact on whether an employee may have an objective expectation of privacy in workrelated electronic communications. 95 Employers do not, however, have unlimited freedom to restrict employees' electronic communications through their policies. Where a workplace rule is likely to have a chilling effect on Section 7 rights, its maintenance may be considered an unfair labor practice, even absent evidence of enforcement. 96 A rule that explicitly restricts activities protected by Section 7 is unlawful. 97 Even if a rule does not explicitly restrict activity protected by Section 7, it can still be unlawful if: "(1) employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights." 98 Applying Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, the NLRB has deemed many employer email and social media policies to be unlawful under the NLRA. 99 100 Recently, an NLRB ALJ concluded the following employer policy was unlawful: "Any inappropriate or prohibited Internet, voice mail or e-mail access or use may result in discipline up to and including termination from employment." 101 As the ALJ explained:
The rule prohibits "inappropriate or prohibited" use of the internet and email, as well as transmitting information to anyone that is "defamatory" and "otherwise offensive ["] . These terms are not defined by [the employer], and the policy fails to provide any examples to clarify for employees what is to be considered inappropriate, defamatory or otherwise offensive. As such, employees would reasonably consider their Section 7 protected activity to be prohibited acts. For example, employees would reasonably fear that criticizing their employer to a third party or to one another would lead to discipline as the criticism may be viewed by the employer as inappropriate, defamatory or offensive. 102 In Purple Communications, Inc., 103 the NLRB ruled that an employer's policy prohibiting personal use of the employer's email system violated employees' Section 7 rights: "employees who have rightful access to their employer's email system in the course of their work have a right to use the email system to engage in Section 7-protected communications on nonworking time." 104 [https://perma.cc/CT5U-YTMY] (declining to extend Purple Communications' rationale to company policy prohibiting employees from downloading non-business related information or participating in web-based surveys without authorization; "I do not read Purple Communications to grant unrestricted right to download materials
Turning the Tables-Employees Monitoring Employers
It is becoming more and more common for employees, often using their smartphones, to record workplace conversations and incidents. 106 Twelve states have statutes that prohibit recording communications without the consent of all parties to the conversation. 107 Section 7 rights. 119 In a series of decisions, the NLRB has severely curtailed the right of employers to ban workplace recordings. 120 For the most part, these decisions rest upon application of Lutheran Heritage VillageLivonia. 121 In Rio All-Suites Hotel & Casino, the NLRB concluded that two employer rules-"Camera phones may not be used to take photos on property without permission from a Director or above" and "Cameras, any type of audio visual recording equipment and/or recording devices may not be used unless specifically authorized for business purposes (e.g. events)"-were unlawfully overbroad. 122 The Board stated, "Employee photographing and videotaping is protected by Section 7 when employees are acting in concert for their mutual aid and protection and no overriding employer interest is present." 123 In addition, neither of these prohibitions was tied to any particularized employer interest, such as the privacy of its patrons. 124 Whole Foods Market banned any recordings without prior approval, with the purpose of eliminating "a chilling effect on the expression of views that may exist when one person is concerned that his or her conversation with As with Whole Foods Market Group, Inc., the Board concluded TMobile's "rule [did] not differentiate between recordings that are protected by Section 7 and those that are not, and[, additionally, included] in its prohibition recordings made during nonwork time and in nonwork areas." 128 T-Mobile argued its recording restriction was "justified by its general interest in maintaining employee privacy, protecting confidential information, and promoting open communication." 129 The Board rejected TMobile's "proffered rationales" because they "cannot justify the rule's broad restriction that employees would reasonably read as prohibiting activity protected by Section 7." 130 The NLRB has found a workplace recording prohibition lawful. In Flagstaff Medical Center, Inc., 131 Board Member-now Chairman-Philip Miscimarra dissented in Whole Foods Market Group, Inc. with respect to the majority-Board's application of Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia. Chairman Miscimarra took issue with the majority's conclusion that "employees would reasonably read the rules as prohibiting recording activity that would be protected by Section 7." 134 Noting that the rules themselves state that their purpose is to "encourage open communication, free exchange of ideas, spontaneous and honest dialogue and an atmosphere of trust" and "to eliminate a chilling effect on the expression of views . . . especially when sensitive or confidential matters are being discussed[,]" 135 he believes "[t]he rules are no less solicitous of open, free, spontaneous and honest conversations about union representation or group action for the purpose of mutual aid or protection than of other subjects of conversation." 136 Chairman Miscimarra has expressed his displeasure in other cases with the way in which the Board has applied Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia. He has stated, for example, that he believes the time has come to abandon the analysis. 137 He believes the Board must, instead:
[E]valuate at least two things: (i) the potential adverse impact of the rule on NLRA-protected activity, and (ii) the legitimate justifications an employer may have for maintaining the rule. The Board must engage in a meaningful balancing of these competing interests, and a facially neutral rule should be declared unlawful only if the justifications are outweighed by the adverse impact on Section 7 activity. 138 As noted above, Philip Miscimarra is now Chairman of the NLRB. 135. Id. at *6 (Miscimarra, Member, dissenting). 136. Id. (Miscimarra, Member, dissenting) ("I believe it strains credulity to find that an employee could reasonably interpret the no-recording rules to prohibit Section 7 activity.").
137 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
In a few cases, federal magistrates have protected employee privacy by rejecting what they considered to be overly broad discovery requests. In Bakhit v. Safety Marking, Inc., 140 the plaintiff sought access to text messages of his former fellow employees in his racial discrimination lawsuit against his former employer. 141 Noting that the right to information through discovery "is counterbalanced by a responding party's confidentiality or privacy interests [,] " 142 the magistrate was concerned with the implication of the individual defendants' privacy interests in the data stored on their cell phones. 143 In Crabtree v. Angie's List, Inc., 144 the plaintiffs finalized sales with service providers for advertising on the Angie's List website and spent a significant portion of their workday using their personal computers and cell phones. 145 When the plaintiffs initiated a Fair Labor Standards Act lawsuit against Angie's List claiming unpaid overtime compensation, the defendant sought to obtain GPS and location services data from the plaintiffs' personal cell phones to "construct a detailed and accurate timeline of when Plaintiffs were or were not working." 146 The magistrate denied the request because it would reveal "all GPS/location data for 24-hours a day for a one year period from a personal device that would be tracking Plaintiffs' movements well outside of their working time." 147
C. State Statutes that May Protect Employee Work-Related Communications
As noted above, twelve states outlaw surreptitious-i.e., without the consent of all parties-recording of conversations. 148 Employment Law: "Eavesdropping via wiretapping has been conspicuously singled out on several occasions as precisely the kind of conduct that gives rise to an intrusion-on-seclusion claim." 150 In addition, two states, Connecticut 151 and Delaware, 152 require employers to provide notice to employees of electronic monitoring. However, Connecticut's statute does not appear to provide much relief for employees who believe they have been monitored without notice, as the Connecticut Supreme Court has ruled the statute does not provide a private right of action to aggrieved employees. 153 Twenty-five states have enacted what may generally be referred to as social media privacy statutes. 154 Fundamentally, these statutes prohibit employers (and prospective employers) from requiring or requesting employees and job applicants 155 to disclose their usernames and passwords to personal online accounts, often including personal email accounts. Many of the statutes also prohibit employers from requesting employees and applicants to access their accounts in the presence of the employer, 156 and some prohibit employers from requiring employees to add them to the list of contacts associated with the employees' accounts. 157 Restatement (Third) of Employment Law § 7.04 reflects the privacy concerns at the core of these state social media privacy statutes:
(a) An employee has a protected privacy interest in information relating to the employee that is of a personal nature and that the employee has made reasonable efforts to keep private. (b) An employer intrudes upon this protected privacy interest by requiring that the employee provide information described in subsection (a) or by obtaining the information through deceit. 158 As this brief review of state statutes reveals, outside of employers surreptitiously recording their employees' conversations, these statutes provide little meaningful workplace privacy protections. While the social media privacy statutes appear the strongest, in reality the situation they address has occurred rarely, and usually in relation to sensitive employment positions, such as teachers, sheriff's deputies, and corrections officials. 159 
III. SMARTPHONES AND FITBITS
As the opening quote in this article from Riley v. California 160 implies, courts are beginning to realize the capacity of devices such as smartphones to store tremendous amounts of personal data. Those data can now include a person's locations twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. In addition, wearable devices, such as the Fitbit, can track personal health information including continuous heart rate, steps taken, stairs climbed, active minutes, amount of sleep, and even GPS location. 161 What remains unanswered is what privacy rights workers have when employers require or encourage the use of these applications and devices, which can easily track movements and activities during non-work time. 
A. GPS Tracking with Smartphones
As Arias v. Intermex Wire Transfer demonstrates, employers may be inclined to track employees' locations using the GPS feature in their smartphones. 162 Because the case settled, we have no way of knowing the strength of Arias's invasion of privacy claim. Courts generally find no privacy violation when the tracking device is installed on a company-owned vehicle. 163 At least eleven states outlaw private citizens from installing or using tracking devices, 164 though they regularly do not apply when the owner or lessor of the vehicle consents to the placement of the tracking device. As such, they provide no protection for private-sector employees when they are driving a company car. For example, California broadly prohibits the use of an "electronic tracking device to determine the location or movement of a person." 165 However, the California statute does not apply "when the registered owner, lessor, or lessee of a vehicle has consented to the use of the electronic tracking device with respect to that vehicle." 166 Similarly, Tennessee's statute, like most of the other state statutes, prohibits the installation of an electronic tracking device on or in a motor vehicle without the consent of all the owners or lessees of the vehicle. 167 (1983)) (holding use of a tracking device on defendant's company car, even though it was assigned to plaintiff, does not constitute a substantial intrusion upon plaintiff's seclusion, as it revealed no more than highly public information as to the van's location; holding further that especially because the van was the property of defendant, defendant's use of the tracking device on its own vehicle does not rise to the level of being highly offensive to a reasonable person); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF As noted earlier, courts have generally found no invasion of privacy when employers have observed employees in public places where the employees' expectations of privacy are diminished. 175 The same concept applies to GPS tracking-individuals driving cars are out in public, generally observable. 176 Public-sector employees' privacy may, however, be afforded greater protection. Under evolving Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, courts are beginning to acknowledge that prolonged GPS tracking can reveal a detailed, intimate portrait of an individual's actions, and that this prolonged tracking 169 Mar. 5, 2015) (holding plaintiffs failed to plead that the placement of a GPS led to the disclosure of private facts; specifically, that plaintiffs failed to plead that the GPS conveyed information that the vehicle was driven into a private secluded location in which plaintiffs would have a reasonable expectation of privacy; in other words, plaintiffs failed to plead how a passerby on the street or an individual in another vehicle could not capture the same information that the tracking device captured and thus failed to plead the disclosure of a private fact) (applying Illinois common law to facts related to interfamily dispute); Villanova v. Innovative Investigations, Inc., 21 A. can defeat an "expectation of privacy that our society recognizes as reasonable." 177 This approach has been applied to public-sector employees. 178 As reported by the Restatement (Third) of Employment Law, "the reasonable expectations of privacy of citizens and residents against intrusion by government law-enforcement agents are likely to be significantly different from the privacy expectations of employees against employer intrusion." 179 
B. Employee Monitoring Through Wellness Programs
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 180 provides a mechanism for employers, through their health insurance plans, to offer their employees programs of health promotion or disease prevention-otherwise known as wellness programs. 181 According to a 2016 Kaiser Family Foundation employer health benefits survey, eighty-three percent of surveyed large firms (200 or more employees) and forty-six percent of small firms offer some sort of wellness program, while sixteen percent of large firms and three percent of small firms collect health information from employees through wearable devices such as a Fitbit or Apple Watch. 182 In particular, employees may be rewarded for participating in a wellness program by receiving up to thirty percent of the cost of coverage under the employer's health plan. 183 Forty-two percent of large firms with a wellness program offer employees a financial incentive to participate in or complete the program; 184 employees, on average, could potentially save between approximately $1,900 to $5,400 per year. 185 While the Americans with Disabilities Act 186 (ADA) limits medical examinations and disability-related inquiries, it also provides safe harbor exceptions from its restrictions on medical testing for employer-mandated, as well as voluntary, medical examinations tied to employers' insurance 187 and wellness plans, 188 respectively. On May 17, 2016, the EEOC issued a final rule with respect to the interplay between the ADA and wellness programs. 189 The wellness program requirement was clearly intended to assist defendant with underwriting, classifying or administering risks associated with the insurance plan. The undisputed evidence establishes that defendant's consultants used the data gathered through the wellness program to classify plan participants' health risks and calculate defendant's projected insurance costs for the benefit year. They then provided recommendations regarding what defendant should charge the plan participants for maintenance medications and preventive care. They also made recommendations regarding plan premiums, which included a recommendation that defendant charge cigarette smokers higher premiums. examinations are permitted. 190 In particular, the program must be voluntary-it cannot deny coverage or benefits for non-participation, nor can there be any retaliation for non-participation. 191 And providing an incentive of up to thirty percent of health coverage cost will not render a program involuntary. 192 Title II of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 193 (GINA) prohibits employers from discriminating against employees based on genetic information, 194 and prohibits employers, with certain exceptions, from acquiring genetic information about an employee. 195 Under the Affordable Care Act, "[a] group health plan, and a health insurance issuer offering health insurance coverage in connection with a group health plan, shall not request or require an individual or a family member of such individual to undergo a genetic test." 196 However, under a voluntary wellness program, an employer may provide a limited incentive 197 for an employee's spouse to provide information about the spouse's current or past health status. 198 Finally, legislation introduced in the House of Representatives, the Preserving Employee Wellness Programs Act, 199 allows collection of genetic information of family members as part of a wellness program. 200 On a practical basis, just how voluntary are wellness programs when individual employees may save up to $1,900 per year by participating? In effect, is this not really a penalty for not participating? The AARP believes so. It filed a complaint against the EEOC seeking a preliminary injunction to stop implementation of the EEOC's wellness program ADA and GINA rules, claiming the definition of "voluntary" adopted by the EEOC is inconsistent with both the ADA and GINA because permitting incentives at up to thirty percent of the cost of coverage renders the incentives coercive. 201 Although the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia initially denied AARP's motion for a preliminary injunction, 202 it subsequently ruled that the EEOC failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its decision to adopt the thirty percent incentive levels in both the ADA and GINA rules. 203 It did not vacate the rules, but remanded them to the EEOC for reconsideration. 204 Put another way, is foregoing the premium discount a "privacy tax?" 205 Fitbit data can reveal a lot of information to an employer: Impulsivity and the inability to delay gratification-both of which might be inferred from one's exercise habits-correlate with alcohol and drug abuse, disordered eating behavior, cigarette smoking, higher credit-card debt, and lower credit scores. Lack of sleep-which a Fitbit tracks-has been linked to poor psychological well-being, health problems, poor cognitive performance, and negative emotions such as anger, depression, sadness, and fear. 206 One scholar has questioned whether companies selling Fitbits and similar wearable technology are in the business of selling devices or in the business of selling the data those devices generate. 207 [T]he data coming off of sensors are incredibly high quality. I can paint an incredibly detailed and rich picture of who you are based on your Fitbit data or any of this other fitness and health data. And that data is so high quality that I can do things like price insurance premiums or I could probably evaluate your credit score incredibly accurately. 208 One could easily conclude that the thirty-percent incentives to participate in "voluntary" wellness programs coerces employees to forego medical privacy otherwise provided by the ADA and GINA.
IV. CONCLUDING ANALYSIS
As noted at the beginning of Part II above, employers have a number of legitimate business reasons-and, in some cases, legal obligations-to monitor their workers. Except in extreme cases (or except under Section 7 of the NLRA as currently applied), employers should have no problems justifying workplace monitoring, particularly during working hours. But technology that almost all workers use allows monitoring twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. All that data may sometime prove too tempting to employers, causing them to cross the boundary from monitoring-to watch or keep track of, usually for a special purpose 209 -to snooping-to make a presumptuous inquiry, especially in a sneaking or meddlesome manner. 210 their vital signs-again, 24/7. 214 Because so many different devices are now collecting data and are interconnected through the Internet, employers have access to an abundance of data beyond just Fitbits at work or social media posts. For example, driving data from a smartphone GPS might provide inferences about personality and habits; electricity usage may reveal lifestyle traits, such as how late an employee stays up at night; and smartphone data may even reveal insights from conversational patterns. 215 All of those data may just prove too tempting for snooping employers. Meanwhile, most of our privacy laws were adopted well before smartphones and the Internet became ubiquitous; they still hunt for physical secluded locations; and, because they are based on reasonable expectations of privacy, they can easily be circumvented by employer policies that eliminate that expectation by informing workers they have no right to privacy in the workplace.
The future-indeed the present-does not bode well for worker privacy. 214 . See, e.g., Brown, supra note 182, at 246 (detailing some of the data risks associated with the use of Fitbits in wellness programs, including re-identification of anonymous data, inaccurate data due to employee misuse or device inaccuracy, and interception of sensitive data by hackers).
215. See Peppet, Internet of Things, supra note 206, at 120.
